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This paper presents and tests a new model of multinational firms to explain a rich array of multinational
behavior. In contrast to most approaches, here the multinational faces costs to transferring its know-how
that are increasing in technological complexity. Costly technology transfer gives rise to increasing
marginal costs of serving foreign markets, which explains why multinational firms are often much
more successful in their home market compared to foreign markets. The model has several key predictions.
First, as transport costs between multinational parent and affiliate increase, firms with complex production
technologies find it relatively difficult to substitute local production for imports from the parent, because
complex technologies are relatively costly to transfer. Second, the activity of affiliates with complex
technologies declines relatively strongly as transport costs from the home market increase, both at
the intensive and the extensive margin. We also show that as transport costs from the home market
increase, affiliates concentrate their imports from the parent on intermediates that are technologically
more complex. We test these hypotheses by employing information on the activities of individual multinational
firms, on the nature of intra-firm trade at the product level, and on the skills required for occupations
with different complexity. The empirical analysis finds strong evidence in support of the model by
confirming all four hypotheses. The analysis shows that accounting for costly technology transfer
within multinational firms is important for explaining the structure of trade and multinational production.
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Multinational ￿rms are often seen as the quintessential global player. At the same time, they
tend to be much more successful in their home market compared to foreign markets. The
combined market share of the car makers General Motors and Ford in the United States,
for example, is close to 40%, compared to only about 20% in Western Europe. National
consumer preferences could play a role, but they can hardly explain why two German car
makers, BMW and Volkswagen, have a market share in all countries of Western Europe that
is more than six times their market share in the United States.1 In this paper, we propose
a di⁄erent explanation.
We start from the premise that multinationals sell less abroad than at home because
there are costs of transferring technology that lowers their productivity abroad. Consistent
with this, the business press often reports that multinational a¢ liates operate with lower
e¢ ciency than their multinational parent plants. Even though multinational ￿rms play an
ever-larger role in the world economy￿ about half of foreign trade and 80% of manufacturing
R&D in the US are conducted by US multinational ￿rms￿ , this research is one of the few
attempts to uncover the underlying factors.
In most analyses of the multinational ￿rm, whether the motive for foreign production is
mainly to save on factor costs or primarily to gain easy market access, multinational par-
ents always fully transfer the ￿rm-speci￿c and non-rival intangible that de￿nes the ￿rm￿ s
technology to their a¢ liates (Helpman 1984, Markusen 1984).2 Thus, ￿rms make no inde-
1BMW and Volkswagen￿ s market shares in Western Europe (in the U.S.) in the year 2008 until September
were 5.9% (2.0%) and 19.8% (2.0%), respectively; source: Ward￿ s AutoInfoBank
2Some recent work focuses on rival ￿rm know-how as it resides within managers while retaining the perfect
1pendent choice on technology transfer.3 In contrast, here the degree of technology transfer
is endogenously determined by both the desire to save on factor and trade costs and by
the di¢ culty of transferring technology within the multinational ￿rm.4 We propose that
technology transfer costs are high in part because some technologies are relatively complex,
and complex technologies require extensive problem-solving communication between parent
and a¢ liate. Technology transfer costs to relatively poor countries are also higher than to
richer countries because the former have a lower ability to adopt technological information
than the latter.
Firms sell di⁄erentiated ￿nal goods produced with intermediate inputs that can be
sourced from di⁄erent countries. In our model, there are two Northern and one South-
ern country. The advantage of importing intermediate inputs from the South is low factor
costs, while importing intermediates from the North is preferred relative to local production
if the technology transfer required to produce is relatively costly. We show that optimal ￿rm
strategies often involve production sharing, where some intermediates are imported while
others are locally produced. The least technologically complex intermediates are sourced
from the South, while the most technologically complex intermediates are produced in the
multinational parent. If a ￿rm originating in a Northern country (East) opens a multina-
tional a¢ liate in the other (West), the a¢ liate will import a greater range of intermediates
transferability assumption (Burstein and Monge-Naranjo 2008).
3In these models, there is international transfer of technology, but it is only at the extensive margin: if
an a¢ liate is established, there is full transfer, and if not, there is zero transfer.
4Along the lines of Dunning￿ s (1977) O(wnership)L(ocation)I(nternalization) paradigm, our paper treats
the O and L aspects simultaneously; in future work, we plan to extent the framework to address the in-
ternalization question as well. We expect that studying the technology transfer of multinational ￿rms will
also improve our understanding of when local ￿rms bene￿t from FDI spillovers, which have recently been
quanti￿ed in Keller and Yeaple (2008).
2from the South than the multinational parent, because the a¢ liate receives the parent￿ s
technology only at a cost, and thus purchasing a greater range of inputs from the South
becomes optimal.
As trade and transfer costs are changing, this framework yields major predictions for the
level and the composition of international economic activity, both at the intensive and the
extensive margin. Speci￿cally, as trade costs from the South decline, sales of multinational
a¢ liates will expand by more than sales of the parent (since a¢ liates rely more strongly
on imports from the South). A¢ liate sales in technologically complex industries are more
a⁄ected by increasing trade costs than a¢ liate sales in less complex industries, because
in the latter it is easier to substitute local production for intermediate imports from the
parent. We also show that lower trade costs between East and West leads to the entry
of new multinational a¢ liates at the same time that exit increases the productivity of the
average multinational parent ￿rm.
These results are obtained by combining our analysis of trade and transfer costs with a
heterogeneous ￿rm model in the spirit of Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004). We then use information for individual U.S. multinational ￿rms from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis on the level of a¢ liate sales, a¢ liate imports from their parents, and the
R&D of the parents as a measure of technological complexity to test our theory￿ s predictions.
Consistent with our model, there is strong evidence that a¢ liate sales decline in trade costs
to the parent, and this e⁄ect is stronger for relatively complex technologies. At the same
time, as trade costs increase, the share of intra-￿rm imports in a¢ liate sales falls less rapidly
for complex technologies than for less complex technologies. This result also supports our
3model, since for a given increase in trade costs, a¢ liates ￿nd it more di¢ cult to substitute
local production for imports from the multinational parent when technologies are complex.
We also ￿nd evidence that not only the value of trade, but also the range of intermediate
inputs that US parents are providing to their a¢ liates is declining in trade costs by using
highly disaggregated data on U.S. exports. This provides direct evidence in favor of our
prediction that as trade costs increase, more and more intermediates are produced locally
by the a¢ liate as opposed to imported from the parent.
Our paper is not alone in highlighting the importance of intermediate inputs in interna-
tional trade ￿ ows (Feenstra 1998, Hummels, Ishii, Yi 2001, Yi 2003). Particularly relevant
for us is the work by Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) who show using data on U.S.
multinational ￿rms that vertical production sharing, where parents and a¢ liates each per-
form di⁄erent tasks but are linked by trade in intermediate inputs, is an important feature
of the data. In Hanson, Mataloni, Slaughter￿ s (2005) framework, such production sharing
is facilitated by both low intermediate trade costs and factor cost savings when activities
di⁄er in their factor intensity. We extend this analysis, ￿rst, by showing that the technolog-
ical complexity of tasks is another important factor that shapes multinational production
networks, both in relatively poor and in richer countries. Second, our analysis determines
also the level of multinational activity in di⁄erent countries, both at the intensive and the
extensive margin, in addition to the composition of production inside the a¢ liates on which
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) focus.
An in￿ uential set of papers has recently examined o⁄shoring, de￿ned as the performance
of tasks (or, intermediate goods) in a country di⁄erent from where a ￿rm￿ s headquarters are
4located (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006, 2008). Di⁄erent factors have been emphasized
in what makes certain tasks easy to o⁄shore. Our analysis shares a resemblance with Levy
and Murnane (2004) and Leamer and Storper (2001); the former argue that routine tasks
are easier to o⁄shore because information can be exchanged with fewer misunderstandings,
while the latter stress that tasks requiring only non-tacit information exchange are relatively
easy to o⁄shore.5 Our contribution in this respect is to provide explicit microfoundations,
based on Arrow (1969), which are highly consistent with the arguments made by Levy and
Murnane (2004) and Leamer and Storper (2001). Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg￿ s (2008)
paper di⁄ers in that heterogeneous o⁄shoring costs are taken as given in a North-North
framework while at the same time they interact with external economies of scale not present
in our work. Moreover, while in our paper factor price di⁄erences a⁄ect o⁄shoring decisions,
as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), our model has nothing to say on the factor
price e⁄ects of changes in o⁄shoring costs, the main focus of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006). At the same time, by including both costs of o⁄shoring tasks￿ here, the costs of
transferring technology within the multinational￿ as well as the usual iceberg-type trade
costs on intermediate and ￿nal goods, our framework allows for a richer set of predictions as
these costs change relative to each other.
The theory of multinational ￿rms tends to view multinationals either as the result of
horizontal expansion (in which the a¢ liate replicates the production activities at home but
saves on the trade costs of exporting) or vertical expansion (in which parent and a¢ liate
5In Head and Ries￿(2008) study of merger & acquisitions FDI, the authors propose the costs of corporate
control vary with distance and cultural similarity; at the same time, such costs might also vary across
intermediate stages of production.
5specialize in di⁄erent parts of production so as to take advantage of factor cost savings).
Correspondingly, the focus of recent empirical work is often on one of these motives. For
example, Brainard (1997) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2008) examine horizon-
tal, whereas Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2008),
and Garetto (2008) study vertical foreign direct investment (FDI).6 Our theory of multina-
tional ￿rms combines horizontal and vertical motives. All FDI is vertical in the sense that
multinational parents and a¢ liates specialize in di⁄erent tasks.7 At the same time, since
our analysis incorporates both trade costs and factor cost di⁄erentials, it includes motives
for horizontal and vertical expansion. Moreover, our empirical analysis con￿rms that both
motives are explaining important parts of the overall pattern of multinational production.
Another set of papers has started to address the important question of how large the gains
from openness are based multi-country general equilibrium models (Eaton and Kortum 2002,
Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare 2008, Burstein and Monge-Naranjo 2008, Garetto 2008, and
Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla 2008); all authors except the in￿ uential work by Eaton
and Kortum (2002) consider, as does this paper, both international trade and FDI. One
contribution of this paper is that the optimal decision on intermediate input purchases,
which determines the level of trade and FDI in this framework, is a smooth function of
costs, whereas in existing work certain margins of choice exist, or do not, in a discrete way.8
Finally, it is important to note that our analysis tests, and con￿rms, key elements of the
6Some empirical studies address both horizontal and vertical FDI, including Carr, Markusen, and Maskus
(2001), Blonigen et al. (2003), and Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005).
7At a relatively ￿ne level of disaggregation, it becomes apparent that multinational parents and a¢ liates
specialize to a signi￿cant degree in di⁄erent tasks (Alfaro and Charlton 2007).
8In Garetto (2008), for example, the costs for ￿nal goods producers to purchase the ￿ adaptable￿technology
used by potential input suppliers is in￿nity.
6model by employing information on individual multinational enterprises. This includes data
on the multinational ￿rms￿technology investments and their intra-￿rm trade, as well as
information on multinational a¢ liate activity both at the extensive margin (entry) and the
intensive margin (sales). This enables us to assess the performance of individual elements of
our model relatively accurately. We believe that this is very useful in order to make progress
on these important questions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The following section 2 describes the model,
characterizes its equilibrium and derives the key empirical predictions of the model. Section 3
derives four central hypotheses that will be tested, describes the data that we have assembled
to do so, and presents the empirical results. We conclude with section 4.
2 Theory
2.1 A Model of Costly Technology Transfer with Multinationals
Consider a world with three countries, E, W, and S that are each endowed with L units of
labor. Countries E and W are identical Northern countries and S is the South. Preferences




















where Y is a homogenous, freely-traded good, ￿i is the expenditure share of the di⁄erentiated
￿nal good i, xi(!) is the volume of variety ! of good i consumed, and ￿i is the set of available
7varieties of good i. The parameter ￿ = 1￿1=￿, where ￿ > 1, is the elasticity of substitution
across varieties. For simplicity, we assume that the South consumes only good Y .
All goods are produced using exclusively labor. Good Y is produced in every country
by perfectly competitive ￿rms. Cross-country variation in the e¢ ciency of Y production
induces di⁄erences in wages across countries. The wage in the North wN exceeds the wage
in the South wS. In each Northern country, there is a continuum of potential entrants. Each
potential entrant is endowed with the property rights over a unique variety associated with
a particular good i.
Any variety of the di⁄erentiated good X is costlessly assembled in the country in which it
is consumed from a continuum of variety-speci￿c intermediates, which are indexed by their
technical complexity, z. Industries di⁄er in the mixture of intermediates that are used in
their production. Speci￿cally, in the industry producing good i the production function is
Cobb-Douglas:













industry-speci￿c constant, m(!;z) is the volume of intermediate input z that is speci￿c to
variety !, and ￿i(z) is the cost share schedule for intermediate z in industry i. We assume
that the cost share function in industry i is given by
￿i(z) = ￿i exp(￿￿iz). (3)
According to the formulation in (3), the average technical complexity for industry i is equal
8to 1=￿i: industries with lower values of ￿i are more technologically complex.
Firms di⁄er in their technological capability (or productivity), ’. In order to produce
its variety, a Northern ￿rm must ￿rst incur an industry-speci￿c ￿xed cost ￿i. Upon entry,
a ￿rm draws its type ’ from a known distribution G. The country in which the ￿rm enters
will henceforth be called the ￿rm￿ s home country, any productive facility in that country
will be called the parent, and any other productive facility owned by that ￿rm in another
country will be called an a¢ liate.
A ￿rm￿ s productivity in producing intermediate inputs depends on its productivity and
on the country in which the intermediate is being produced. If a ￿rm produces a given
intermediate z in its home country, then its labor productivity is given by its type ’: one
unit of labor can produce ’ units of any intermediate. If the ￿rm produces an intermediate
input z in any country other than its home country then its productivity at that location
is reduced because of the existence of costs to international technology transfer. The size
of this labor productivity loss depends on the technological complexity of the intermediate
input z and on country characteristics. Such technology transfer costs due on international
communication problems are stressed by Arrow (1969), who argued that there can be large
e¢ ciency losses when communication between teachers (here the multinationals￿parents)
and students (here the multinationals￿a¢ liates) fails.9
To produce one unit of an intermediate input, suppose that a number of tasks, given by
z, must be successfully completed. In the application of each task, problems arise that will,
9Technological information is di¢ cult to communicate because it is often not fully codi￿ed; Feldman and
Lichtenberg (1998) demonstrate empirically that codi￿ability is associated with better transfer of informa-
tion, and Teece (1977) shows that transfer costs account for a substantial portion of all costs of shifting
production from multinational parent to a¢ liate.
9if unsolved, result in the destruction of that unit. A plant￿ s management must communicate
the problem to the ￿rm￿ s headquarters which must in turn communicate to the plant the
solution to the problem. If communication is successful for each task, then one unit of
the input is produced. If the solution to any problem fails to be communicated, then the
input that is produced is useless. When the plant and the headquarters are in the same
country, we assume that there is no di¢ culty in communication, but when headquarters and
the plant are in di⁄erent countries, the probability of successful communication is e ￿ 2 (0;1).
Assuming that the success rate of communication is independent across tasks, the probability
of successful communication is (e ￿)z. If a units of labor were committed to the production
of one unit of an intermediate input, then a(e ￿)z is the ￿e⁄ective￿labor input. A decrease in
the communicability of technology thus results in a decrease in productivity for intermediate
z equal to the inverse of (e ￿)z:
1=(e ￿)
z = exp(￿z lne ￿)
= exp(￿z); (4)
where the parameter ￿ ￿ ￿lne ￿ > 0 is inversely related to communicability and so measures
the ine¢ ciency costs of international technology transfer. Hence, higher z are associated
with higher technology transfer costs. We assume that labor in the North is better trained
than Southern labor, and so the magnitude of technology transfer costs to the South are
higher in the South than to the North: ￿S > ￿N. Hence, the e⁄ective productivity of a ￿rm
with home productivity level ’ producing intermediate z is e ’j(’;z) in a foreign country
10j 2 fN;Sg is
e ’j(’;z) = ’exp(￿￿jz): (5)
A ￿rm that has learned its type must then decide in which countries to sell its variety.
To sell its variety in a given country, the ￿rm must incur ￿xed labor cost f to market and
distribute its variety. There are no other ￿xed costs.
Final goods are assembled in the country in which they will be sold, but the source of
any given intermediate input is chosen by the ￿rm. Any given intermediate input could
be produced in either of the Northern countries, or in the South, or in all three locations.
This choice will depend on relative labor costs wN=wS, on the size of technology transfer
costs ￿S and ￿N, and on transport costs. Any intermediate input or di⁄erentiated ￿nal good
shipped between Northern countries incurs an iceberg-type transport cost ￿N > 1. Any
intermediate input or di⁄erentiated ￿nal good shipped from the South to the North incurs
iceberg transport cost ￿S > 1.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, ￿rms incur entry costs. Second, ￿rms choose
which Northern market to set up an assembly plant and distribution networks to sell their
products. Third, ￿rms choose where to produce their intermediates. Finally, ￿rms assemble
their ￿nal product and sell output on the monopolistically competitive product market.
2.2 Equilbrium and Empirical Implications of the Model
We now develop the main empirical implications of our theory in a series of propositions.
The equilibrium is described by, ￿rst, solving for the optimal intermediate input sourcing
11decisions of ￿rms conditional on their decision to sell their product in the home and foreign
markets. Second, we examine how transport costs and technology transfer costs a⁄ect the
international structure of multinationals￿operations. It is shown that as transport costs
between multinational parent and a¢ liate increase, the latter concentrate on intermediate
imports from the parent that are technologically relatively complex. Moreover, this techno-
logical complexity also plays a key role in determining a¢ liate activity at both the extensive
and intensive margins, as well as for the trade-o⁄ between imports from the parent versus
local a¢ liate production. These central implications of our theory are examined empirically
in section 4. The description of the model￿ s equilibrium is completed in the appendix, which
also derives additional predictions on the relative importance of North-North compared to
North-South FDI as transport costs change.
Transport Costs and the Structure of Intra-Firm Trade We begin by deriving the
optimal intermediate sourcing decisions of a ￿rm of type ’ whose parent is in one Northern
country (e.g. E) and that owns an assembly a¢ liate in the other Northern country (e.g. W).
First, consider the decision for the parent ￿rm. Let the minimum cost of a parent ￿rm of type
’ of procuring intermediate z be cP(’;z). For each intermediate input, the parent can either
produce the intermediate itself or procure it from an a¢ liate in the South.10 If the parent
￿rm produces the intermediate z locally, it pays the northern wage wN and its productivity
is ’, so cP(’;z) = wN=’. If the intermediate is procured from an a¢ liate in the South, it
pays the Southern wage wS, incurs transport cost ￿S, and incurs technology costs transfer
10This parent ￿rm will never procure an intermediate from an a¢ liate in the other Northern country
because doing so incurs transport and technology-transfer costs that it can avoid by producing locally.
12costs that reduce its productivity to ’exp(￿￿Sz). In this case, cP(’;z) = wS￿S exp(￿Sz)=’.






Assuming that wS￿S < wN, and noting that technology transfer costs are increasing in z, it
follows that the least technologically complex intermediates are produced in the South while













such that all intermediates z < b zP
S are sourced from a Southern a¢ liate and all the remaining
intermediates are produced in the home country by the parent.
Now consider the sourcing decision of the multinational￿ s a¢ liate in the other Northern
country. Let cA(’;z) be the minimum cost to the a¢ liate of a ￿rm of type ’ to procure
intermediate z. The ￿rm has three options for procuring this intermediate. First, it can
obtain the intermediate from its parent in which case the wage paid is wN, the transport
cost is ￿N, and the productivity is ’, so cA(’;z) = wN￿N=’. Second, the ￿rm can obtain
the intermediate from a Southern a¢ liate in which case the marginal cost of the Northern
a¢ liate is the same as it would be for the parent: cA(’;z) = wS￿S exp(￿Sz)=’. Finally,
the a¢ liate can produce the intermediate input itself in which case it pays a wage of wN,
pays no transport costs, and produces with e¢ ciency level ’exp(￿￿Nz), so cA(’;z) =
13wN exp(￿Nz)=’. The minimum cost of procuring intermediate z for assembly at a Northern





minfwN￿N;wS￿S exp(￿Sz);wN exp(￿Nz)g: (8)
Given our assumption that foreign productivity is decreasing in z, it follows that the most
technologically complex intermediates must be sourced from the parent. Our assumption
that wS￿S < wN implies that the least technologically complex intermediates will be sourced
from a Southern a¢ liate. If ￿S is su¢ ciently large relative to ￿N, the intermediate inputs of
a moderate technological complexity will be most cheaply produced locally. Assuming this
is the case, intermediates z < b zA




















are imported by the a¢ liate from its parent ￿rm, and intermediates z 2 [b zA
S;b zA
N] are produced
locally by the a¢ liate. We can now summarize two key results in the following propositions.
First, comparing equations (7) and (9) establishes the ￿rst proposition.
Proposition 1 A¢ liates source a wider range of intermediate inputs from the South than
their parents, i.e. b zP
S < b zA
S.
This result on parent versus a¢ liate￿ s import range from the South is the consequence
14of costly technology transfer within the multinational enterprise. That increases the cost of
producing each intermediate in a Northern a¢ liate relative to the cost of producing at the
parent so that for the threshold intermediate b zP
S , the cost of production in the parent ￿rm is
the same as in the Southern a¢ liate but strictly higher for the a¢ liate in the other Northern
country. Hence, the a¢ liate will strictly prefer to import that intermediate from a Southern
a¢ liate rather than produce the intermediate itself.
Di⁄erentiating equation (10) establishes the second proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in the size of transport cost ￿N increases b zA
N and so (i) reduces
the range of intermediates imported from the parent and (ii) increases the average technical
complexity of the intermediates it imports from the parent.
According to this result, the commodity composition of a¢ liates￿imports from their par-
ent ￿rms should become more concentrated in fewer categories that are more technologically
complex as transport costs between a¢ liate and parent ￿rm rise. The increase in transport
costs from the parent means that the intermediate good with threshold technological com-
plexity b zA
N is now strictly cheaper obtained locally. As a consequence, the a¢ liate￿ s imports
from the parent will concentrate on intermediates that are more complex than the level b zA
N.
In the limit as transport costs increase, parents export only the most technologically complex
intermediate as headquarter service￿ all other inputs are locally produced by the a¢ liate.
The Structure of International Production In this section, we show how technolog-
ical complexity a⁄ects the trade-o⁄ between imports from the parent versus local a¢ liate
production. Also, technology transfer costs that are increasing in complexity are shown to
15yield predictions for both the extensive and intensive margins of a¢ liate activity. We ￿rst
calculate the cost share of intermediate inputs that foreign a¢ liates in Northern countries
procure from their parent ￿rms as a function of transport costs, and we show how this re-
lationship can be used to infer cross-country and cross-industry variation in the marginal
cost facing multinationals in serving foreign markets. We then derive the implications of
this variation in marginal costs for a¢ liates￿sales and the likelihood that a ￿rm will open a
foreign a¢ liate.
Let ￿i be the optimal share of imported intermediates in the total costs of a foreign
a¢ liate of a ￿rm in industry i. The Cobb-Douglas production technology combined with
the observation that all intermediates with a technological complexity greater than b zA
N are






where ￿i(z) is given by equation (3). Substituting out ￿i(z), integrating, substituting for b zA
N
using (10), and then taking logarithms of the resulting expression yields the following simple





From this expression, the following important proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3 The share of intermediates imported from the parent ￿rm in total costs,
16￿i, is strictly decreasing in transport costs between a¢ liate and parent, and the rate of this
decline is slower in technologically complex industries (low ￿i).
For a given increase in transport costs, the cost share of intermediates imported from
the parent ￿rm in total a¢ liate cost is decreasing more slowly in technologically complex
industries because these industries are intensive in intermediates whose production is hard
to move o⁄shore. In contrast, for non-complex intermediates it is easy to substitute local
a¢ liate production for imports from the parent. This has important implications for the
structure of marginal costs of a¢ liates across countries and across industries because indus-
tries featuring complex technologies will be more exposed to transport cost changes than
less technologically complex industries.
To see this, we now calculate the marginal cost of an a¢ liate as a function of transport
costs. Cost-minimization implies that the marginal cost of assembling the variety of a ￿rm
of type ’ in industry i at the a¢ liate or parent (indicated by k 2 fA;Pg) is
C
k







To calculate the marginal cost facing the Northern a¢ liate of a ￿rm of type ’ in
industry i, substitute for cA(’;z) using (8) and the cuto⁄s (9) and (10), and then integrate





























Here, gA(:) summarizes the e⁄ect of costly technology transfer, transport costs, and the
factor cost di⁄erences on the marginal cost of serving the foreign market.
Now consider the e⁄ect on the marginal cost of the a¢ liate in industry i of an increase in
￿N, the size of transport costs between the parent and the a¢ liate. Di⁄erentiating equation














The following lemma can be obtained by di⁄erentiating this equation.
Lemma 1 The elasticity of the marginal cost of the a¢ liate with respect to ￿N ("CA
￿N;i) is
higher in technologically relatively complex (low ￿) industries.
It is useful to compare equation (16) which relates technology transfer costs ￿N, tech-
nological complexity ￿i, and transport costs ￿N, to the elasticity of marginal cost of the
a¢ liate with respect to transport costs to the cost share of intermediates imported from
the parent, given by equation (12). We observe that ln("CA
￿N;i) = ln￿i, so the logarithm of
the cost share of imported intermediates is a su¢ cient statistic for the elasticity of marginal
costs with respect to the size of transport costs between a¢ liate and parent. By estimating
the relationship between technological complexity, transport costs, and ln￿i, we can infer
18the e⁄ect of these variables on a¢ liates￿marginal costs.
We now derive the implications of Lemma 1 for other key variables: the structure of a
￿rm￿ s a¢ liate￿ s sales conditional on opening a foreign a¢ liate in a given country and the
likelihood that a given ￿rm will open an a¢ liate in the ￿rst place. We begin our analysis
of the structure of ￿rms￿international operations by deriving the optimal level of sales
generated in each market conditional on entry.
The preferences given by (1) imply that the demand for the variety of a type ’ ￿rm in










where pik(’) is the price charged by the ￿rm in industry i of type ’ in country k, and P i is
the price index for good i in each of the Northern countries.
It is well known that a ￿rm facing the iso-elastic demand curve (17) optimally charges a
constant proportional mark-up over marginal costs (1=￿ > 1). Substituting for the parent￿ s
marginal cost using (14), we ￿nd that the optimal revenue of generated by an a¢ liate of
parent ￿rm of type ’ in industry i in a foreign market is
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19is the endogenous, mark-up adjusted demand level in a Northern country in industry i, and
CA
i (’) is given by equation (14). Totally di⁄erentiating (18) and holding ￿xed Ai, we ￿nd
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This equation combined with Lemma 1 has the following implication.
Proposition 4 Holding ￿xed the mark-up adjusted demand level, Ai, the value of a¢ liate
revenues RA
i (’) is decreasing in the transport costs ￿N, and the rate of this decrease is highest
in technologically relatively complex (low ￿) industries.
This second observation follows from the fact that in technologically complex industries
more of the global value added is in intermediates that are costly to o⁄shore, and so marginal
costs rise faster in transport costs.
Similarly, a ￿rm will open an assembly a¢ liate in the other Northern country if gross







￿ wNf ￿ 0: (19)
Substituting (18) and (14) into this expression and rearranging yields the cuto⁄productivity











20Di⁄erentiating equation (20) with respect to ￿N and using Lemma 1, we can establish the
following important result.
Proposition 5 Holding ￿xed a foreign country￿ s mark-up adjusted demand level Ai, the
probability that any given ￿rm invests in that country is decreasing in transport costs be-
tween parent and a¢ liate (￿N). Everything else equal, this rate of decrease is higher in
technologically relatively complex (low ￿) industries.
This result is closely linked to our earlier results. An a¢ liate￿ s marginal cost is higher
when the transport cost between parent and a¢ liate is greater, and the rate at which mar-
ginal cost increases is faster in more complex industries (see Proposition 3). Therefore,
holding all other country variables ￿xed, the threshold b ’
A
i rises faster in technologically
complex industries and the likelihood that any given ￿rms productivity exceeds this thresh-
old is decreasing.
We now turn to testing these predictions.
3 Empirical Analysis
The model o⁄ers a rich set of predictions over the structure of intra-￿rm trade and the
location and volume of multinational activity that will be examined in this section. We begin
by summarizing the predictions for the case where transport costs between multinational
parent and a¢ liate (￿N) increase, relative to transport costs to the South and the costs
of technology transfer. An increase in ￿N reduces the share of imports in total a¢ liate
costs relatively less in technologically complex industries (Hypothesis 1). An increase in
21Northern transport costs lowers a¢ liate sales particularly strongly in technologically complex
industries (Hypothesis 2). And an increase in ￿N reduces the probability that a ￿rm invests
particularly strongly in technologically complex industries (Hypothesis 3). We will refer to
these as, respectively, the hypotheses on the mix of imports versus local production, on the
intensive margin, and on the extensive margin of multinational activity.11
Note that if intermediates are technologically complex, this moderates the substitution
from imports to local production while at the same time it exacerbates the response of
a¢ liate activity to an increase in transport costs both at the intensive and the extensive
margin. The data most suitable to testing this powerful distinction is the con￿dential ￿rm-
level information from the BEA on the structure of U.S. multinationals￿global operations.
This is because one can directly observe the total cost share of intermediates imported by the
a¢ liates from their parent ￿rms and the location and host country sales of these a¢ liates.
Below we derive the corresponding estimation equations, provide additional information on
the BEA dataset, and conduct this empirical analysis.
Another prediction of our theory to be tested is that as ￿N increases, multinational
a¢ liates concentrate on intermediate imports from their parents that are technologically
more complex (Hypothesis 4).12 The changing nature of U.S. intra-￿rm trade is captured
best by U.S. Census information on related-party trade which varies by country and six-
digit industry classi￿cation.13 Below we show how the related-party trade data can be used
together with information on the importance of complex problem solving skills from the U.S.
11These three hypotheses are based on Proposition 3, Proposition 4, and Proposition 5, respectively.
12See Proposition 2 above.
13There is no ￿rm-level data on the technological complexity of intra-￿rm trade that we are aware of.
22Department of Labor￿ s Occupational Information Network to shed light on how U.S. exports
vary across destination countries in their technological complexity.
The following two sections describe how Hypothesis 1 to 4 are tested with these data.
The Structure of U.S. Multinationals￿Global Operations The BEA data allows us
to observe many features of the international operations of U.S. multinational ￿rms. Chief
among these features are the cost share of intermediate inputs obtained by the a¢ liates
of U.S. multinationals, the sales of these a¢ liates in their host countries, and the location
decisions of these a¢ liates. Consider ￿rst the share of intermediate inputs imported by an
a¢ liate from its parent ￿rm j in an a¢ liate￿ s total cost. In the model, this variable is the







Hypothesis 1 says that while generally the import cost share is declining in ￿N, this is less so
the case when intermediates are technologically complex (low ￿i). In terms of observables,
let Mjk be the value of goods imported by an a¢ liate of ￿rm j located in country k from its
parent ￿rm, and let TCjk be the total costs of that same a¢ liate. Further, let FCk be the
size of transport costs between the parent ￿rm (in our data located in the United States)
and the a¢ liate in country k. The analog to ￿i(b zA








23The transfer cost (￿N) and technological complexity (￿j) parameters are not observed. We
address this by, ￿rst, assuming that technology transfer costs are the same across countries
in which ￿rms sell their good to ￿nal customers. Second, we parametrize the technological
complexity of ￿rm j by the parent￿ s R&D intensity (R&D expenditures over sales). To
the extent that technology transfer costs are problem solving communication costs, as in
equation (4), it is reasonable to assume that they are higher, the higher is the ￿rm￿ s R&D
intensity. Thus we assume that the technological complexity of ￿rm j is
￿j = ￿0 + ￿1RDj;
where RDj is the R&D intensity of ￿rm j in industry i, and ￿0 and ￿1 are parameters.
Now, allowing for (unmodelled) observed country characteristics that in￿ uence the ability
of a country to absorb technology Xk, ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects ￿j, and idiosyncratic unobserved













lnFCk + "jk (21)
where ￿ is a vector of unknown coe¢ cients. We assume that "jk is well-behaved in the
sense that it is uncorrelated with observed country characteristics so that we may estimate
equation (21) via ordinary least squares. Hypothesis 1 is that the coe¢ cient
￿0
￿N < 0 and
that the coe¢ cient estimate
￿1
￿N > 0. As transport costs increase, ￿rms substitute local
production for imports of intermediates from the parent, but this substitution is more costly
in technologically relatively complex industries with hard to transfer technologies.
24Now consider the intensive margin of a¢ liate activity. The relationship between the
revenue generated by an a¢ liate from sales in its host country and the magnitude of transport
costs between the parent and the a¢ liate is given by equation (18). Taking the logarithm of
equation (18), we have
lnR
A(’) = lnAi + (￿ ￿ 1)ln(’) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)g
A(￿S;￿N;￿S;￿N;￿i);
where gA(:) is given by equation (15). Holding ￿xed the mark-up adjusted demand level
Ai, the size of an a¢ liate￿ s revenue should be increasing in the ￿rm￿ s productivity ’ and
decreasing in the size of transport costs between the a¢ liate and its parent ￿rm. As shown
above, the size of the e⁄ect of transport costs should be larger (decreasing faster) in tech-
nologically relatively complex industries because technology is more di¢ cult to transfer in
those industries. We consider the following linearized version of this equation that relates
the sales revenue of the a¢ liate of ￿rm j in country k, Rjk, to transport costs FCk and other
country characteristics:
lnRjk = ￿j + ￿lnXk + (&0 + &1RDj)lnFCk + ￿jk; (22)
where ￿j is a ￿rm-￿xed e⁄ect that absorbs ￿rm j￿ s productivity, Xk is the same vector of
controls as in equation (21) and ￿ is the corresponding coe¢ cient, ￿jk is a well-behaved error
term. Our Hypothesis 2 is that &0 < 0 and &1 < 0: a¢ liate sales in technologically relatively
complex sectors (high RDj) are more sensitive to variation in transport costs FCk. The
di⁄erence in the predicted sign on the interaction between RDj and FCk in equations (21)
25and (22) has strong empirical bite.
Finally, on the extensive margin of a¢ liate activity, Hypothesis 3 states that the proba-
bility of individual ￿rms to enter individual foreign markets should be decreasing in the size
of transport costs between the parent ￿rm and the prospective host country and that the size
of this decrease should be more pronounced in technologically relatively complex industries.
This relationship is driven by the foreign entry condition that a ￿rm should enter if
RA(’)
￿
￿ wNf ￿ 0:
Letting Yjk equal one if ￿rm j owns an a¢ liate in country k and zero otherwise, we assume
that a ￿rm will invest if the latent variable Y ￿
jk > 0, with
Y
￿
jk = lnRjk + ￿jk; (23)
where ￿jk is a random error term associated with the ￿xed cost of investment facing ￿rm
j when investing in country k (if ￿xed costs are the same across countries than they will
be absorbed into the ￿xed e⁄ects). Because the same country characteristics that make
the optimal volume of sales larger in a given country also increase the probability to enter
the market in the ￿rst place, everything else equal, the independent variables for the entry
estimation equation (23) are the same as in the revenue equation (22).
The data for testing Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 come from the BEA which collects con￿dential
enterprise-level data on U.S. foreign direct investment.14 Our data is extracted from the
14The BEA conducts annual surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad where U.S. direct investment is
261994 Benchmark Survey results for U.S. a¢ liates abroad that are majority-owned by U.S.
manufacturing parent ￿rms. We calculate the technical complexity of each ￿rm j; RDj; as
the ratio of the parent ￿rm￿ s R&D spending to the parent ￿rm￿ s total sales. Each a¢ liate
in each country k is linked to a unique parent ￿rm, allowing us to construct the variable
ENTRYjk, which is equal to one if parent ￿rm j owns an a¢ liate in country k and is zero
otherwise; this is the dependent variable for estimation equation (23). The local sales variable
Rjk in estimation equation (22) is constructed by aggregating the sales to local customers
of all the a¢ liates in country k owned by ￿rm j. The cost share of intermediate inputs
imported from the parent of ￿rm j by its a¢ liates in country k, Mjk=TCjk (see equation
21), is constructed by dividing total imports of all a¢ liates from their parent by the total
cost of goods sold.15
The Scope and Technological Complexity of Exports by U.S. Parents to their Af-
￿liates Hypothesis 4 posits that a¢ liates￿imports from their parent ￿rms should become
more concentrated in technologically complex intermediates as trade cost increase. This
de￿ned as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least 10 percent of the
voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unicorporated
business enterprise. A U.S. multinational entity (MNE) is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that
has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called
the foreign a¢ liate. The International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act requires that ￿rms ￿le
detailed ￿nancial and operating items for the parent ￿rm and each a¢ liate.
15For robustness, we also constructed several alternative measures using di⁄erent measures of intermediate
imports. One concern is that FDI is sometimes associated with wholesale distribution activities, as opposed
to production and assembly. To ensure that imports are actually intermediates, we used a variable de￿ned
as intended ￿for further manufacture.￿Results obtained using this narrower measure are very similar to our
primary measure and are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.







which gives a positive relationship between the technical complexity of the cuto⁄ interme-
diate (b zA
N) and the size of shipping costs (￿N). An increase in b zA
N implies that the set of
intermediate inputs that are imported decreases and that the average technical complexity
of the intermediate inputs in that set increases. Note that this hypothesis does not involve
any cross-industry or cross-￿rm variation, only variation across countries.
To test Hypothesis 4, we de￿ne two country-level variables: SCOPEk, which is the
number of products exported from U.S. parents to their foreign a¢ liates in country k, and
TCPXk, which is the average technical complexity of exports from U.S. parents to their for-
eign a¢ liates in country k. We then regress each of these variables on the size of transport
costs to country k, FCk. According to Hypothesis 4, the coe¢ cient on FCk should be nega-
tive when SCOPEk is the dependent variable and positive when TCPXk is the dependent
variable. To control for countries￿ability to absorb technology, we include the set of country
countrols Xk in each of these regressions.
Our measures of the scope and technological complexity of U.S. intra-￿rm exports are
constructed from data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Labor.16
The Census Bureau reports all related party trade between U.S. entities and foreign entities,
where a related party is one in which there exists at least a 6 percent ownership share. This
16The related-party export data were downloaded from the following Census Bureau website:
http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/relatedparty/.
28dataset contains all related party exports by six-digit NAICS industrial classi￿cation for all
the countries in our BEA dataset. There are 500 NAICS six-digit manufacturing industries.
While some of these exports are from U.S. a¢ liates of foreign parents to their foreign parents,
the BEA data reveal that, in the aggregate at least, most of these exports are from U.S.
parents to their foreign a¢ liates.17 Our data are for the year 2002.
Let Exik be the value of related party exports in commodity i from the U.S. to country






f1jExik > 0g; (24)
where f1jExik > 0g is an indicator function equal to one if exports of commodity i to country
k is positive. We measure the average technical complexity of U.S. related party exports to






TCPi ￿ f1jExik > 0g; (25)
where TCPi is the complexity of the technology for commodity i. For robustness, we consider
two alternative measures of TCPi. The ￿rst is based on the average complexity of occupations
used in the manufacture of these commodities. The second is the skill intensity of each
commodity.
The occupations data is less familiar, so we provide more details on it (our construction
17The BEA data report that in 1997, the aggregate shipments of U.S. parents to their foreign majority
owned a¢ liates was $193 billion while the aggregate shipments of U.S. a¢ liates to their foreign parents was
only $28 billion.
29broadly follows Costinot et al. 2008). From the U.S. Department of Labor￿ s Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) we obtained an index of the importance of complex problem
solving skills for each of 809 occupations as de￿ned in the Standard Occupational Classi￿-
cation (SOC) system. Importance is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, and ￿complex problem
solving skills￿is described as the need to ￿identify complex problems and reviewing related
information to develop and evaluate options and implement solutions.￿To faciliate matching
these occupational measures to industrial data, we ￿rst aggregated occupational complexity
data to 22 two-digit occupations, using the share of each 6-digit occupation category and na-
tionwide employment weights. The resulting measures of occupational complexity were then
merged with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics￿Occupational Employment Statistics
for 2006, which provides employment information on each occupation by 4-digit NAICS in-
dustry categories. Using occupational employment shares by industry, we calculated TCPi
in each of 86 4-digit NAICs manufacturing industries.18 For the skill-intensity based measure
of TCPi; we compute each commodity￿ s skill intensity as the ratio of non-production workers
to production workers in each 6-digit NAICS industry from employment data reported in
the 2002 Census of Manufacturing.19
Finally, for each country we obtain measures of the size of transport costs FCk between
the U.S. and country k and a set of country variables Xk to control for unobserved variation
in factor costs, market size, and other factors. We follow Brainard (1997) in constructing
18Our concordance is not perfect because technical complexity is measured at the four digit level while
the trade data is at the 6-digit data. To avoid losing important variation in the extensive margin of trade,
we apply each measure of commodity technical complexity to several 6-digit commodities.
19We also experimented with trade share based weights rather than simple averages. While the coe¢ cients
on some of the controls were di⁄erent, the coe¢ cient on FCk was very similar.
30an ad-valorem measure of transport costs derived from U.S. import data. Our measure FCk
is the ad-valorem measure of c.i.f imports divided by f.o.b. imports into the United States
by country and by industry. To create a single measure of country-level transport costs, we
demeaned the data by industry and kept only country-speci￿c averages obtained from this
demeaned data.20
To control for variation across countries in the mark-up adjusted demand level and for a
country￿ s ability to absorb foreign technology, we include in many speci￿cations the logarithm
of a country￿ s GDP per capita, GDPPC, and the logarithm of its population, POP. Both
measures are for the year 1994 and were taken from the Penn World Tables. Because intra-
￿rm trade can be used to shift pro￿ts in response to variation in country taxes rates, we
also include the logarithm of each country￿ s maximum corporate tax rate, TAX, which was
taken from the University of Michigan database. The means and standard deviations of
each dependent and independent variable for each dataset are shown in the Table 1. The
descriptive statistics for the ￿rm-level multinational dataset is reported in the upper portion
of Table 1. It contains information on the activities of over 5,400 a¢ liates of 1,055 parent
￿rms located in 40 countries. The lower part of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the
scope and technological complexity of U.S. related party trade and the other country-level
variables.
The next section presents our empirical results.
20Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) discuss the measurement of trade costs in great detail. They suggest
a number of imperfect measures of trade costs and the issues associated with aggregation. In future work,
we plan to explore the importance of additional measures of trade costs, including measures that incorporate
trade policy related barriers such as tari⁄s and non-tari⁄ barriers.
31Empirical Results We ￿rst examine the trade-o⁄ between imports and local production
as transport costs change (Hypothesis 1). The results for estimating equation (21) using the
￿rm-level BEA data are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. In column (1) coe¢ cient
estimates are reported which correspond to the speci￿cation that excludes country controls,
while they are included in column (2). All regressions include ￿rm-level ￿xed e⁄ects, and
the standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. We see that
as predicted by the model, the coe¢ cients on transport cost, FC, in both columns (1)
and (2) are negative and statistically signi￿cant, while the coe¢ cients on the interaction
between R&D intensity and transport cost, RD ￿ FC, in both columns are positive and
statistically signi￿cant. The cost share of intermediates imported from the parent ￿rm is
declining in the size of transport costs, but the rate of this decline is slower for ￿rms that
trade in technologically relatively complex intermediates. The coe¢ cients on the control
variables in column (2) indicate that other country characteristics in￿ uence the cost share
of intermediates imported from their parent ￿rm. The negative coe¢ cient on GDPPC
indicates that a¢ liates in less developed countries rely more on imported inputs than a¢ liates
in developed countries. This result suggests that a¢ liates in developing countries face more
serious technology transfer costs than in developed countries.
These results are robust to a number of speci￿cation changes. First, instead of exploiting
only variation within a given multinational ￿rm, implied by the inclusion of ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects,
we have repeated the analysis by exploiting within-industry variation. Table A1 in the
appendix shows that this leads to similar results (columns (1) and (2)). Second, we employ
a narrower de￿nition of a¢ liates￿imported intermediates, imports of goods intended for
32further manufacture. This will exclude wholesale distributors from our sample, for which
our model arguably applies to a lesser extent. Using this imports measure generates almost
identical results (see columns (3) and (4) of Table A1). In addition, we have experimented
with using data on a¢ liate imports from the multinational parent and all other U.S. entities
to see whether outsourcing of intermediate production is a serious concern for our inferences.
However, the results using this import data were virtually identical to those obtained using
our preferred measure. To sum up, we ￿nd strong evidence for Hypothesis 1: technological
complexity a⁄ects the trade-o⁄between a¢ liate imports and local a¢ liate production in the
way the model predicts.
Next we provide evidence on the in￿ uence of costly technology transfer on the intensive
margin of a¢ liate operations (Hypothesis 2). Results for the estimating equation (22) are
shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. In both columns, the coe¢ cients on FC are
negative and statistically signi￿cant, and the coe¢ cients on RD ￿ FC are also negative and
statistically signi￿cant. This con￿rms our Hypothesis 2: we ￿nd that, holding ￿xed the
￿rm, a¢ liates in countries where transport costs are high are smaller and hence they sell
less, and this e⁄ect is more pronounced for ￿rms with relatively complex technologies. These
e⁄ects are robust to controlling GDP per capita and country size as shown in column (4).
The results suggest that after controlling for a country￿ s level of development and size, the
marginal cost of production is rising in transport costs, and that holds particularly for ￿rms￿
that sell technologically relatively complex products. Moreover, these results are con￿rmed
in speci￿cations employing industry- instead of ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (see columns (5) and (6) in
Table A1).
33The analysis so far con￿rms two central implications of our model of costly technology
transfer. On the one hand, because costly transfer raises a¢ liates￿marginal costs, they
reduce sales particularly strongly when they have most bite￿ which is for technologically
complex products. On the other hand, the impact of an increase in transport costs between
parent and a¢ liate is not as large for technologically complex products as it is for less complex
products. This is because for an a¢ liate to reduce its reliance on imported intermediates
from its parent, it would have to be able to produce them locally, and that is relatively
costly when products are technologically complex. Our results provide strong evidence on
both channels through which costly technology transfer within the multinational ￿rm a⁄ects
its operations.
We now turn to Hypothesis 3, which concerns the extensive margin of a¢ liate activity:
high transport costs and complex technology reduce, everything else equal, the probability
that a ￿rm will establish a multinational a¢ liate in a foreign country (see equation 23). The
￿fth and sixth columns of Table 2 report the coe¢ cient estimates for a linear probability
model of multinational a¢ liate entry. The coe¢ cients on FC are negative and statistically
signi￿cant, and the coe¢ cients on RD ￿ FC are also negative and statistically signi￿cant.
These results con￿rm Hypothesis 3 and support the idea that while a¢ liates￿marginal costs
generally are increasing in transport cost, this rate of increase is particularly fast for ￿rms
with complex technologies.
These results indicate that multinationals￿marginal costs are rising in the transport cost
to their host country and that the rate of increase is fastest for ￿rms using complex tech-
nologies. There is also evidence that the technological complexity of some products explains
34why some ￿rms can substitute local production for intermediates imported from their parent
better than other ￿rms. We can bring to bear additional evidence on this by analyzing direct
measures of the scope and the technological complexity of U.S. multinational parent exports
to their a¢ liates. According to Hypothesis 4, the scope of multinational a¢ liate imports
from their parents falls as the transport costs between parent and a¢ liate rise, because
it becomes optimal to locally produce a larger set of intermediates. In addition, this also
raises the average technological complexity of a¢ liate imports, because the newly locally
produced intermediates are less technologically complex compared to those that continue to
be imported from the parent.
In Table 3, we present results from employing our SCOPE and technological complexity
(TCP) variables that support this hypothesis. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the
scope regression results. Columns (3) and (4) report the coe¢ cient estimates for the tech-
nological complexity of export regressions where technological complexity is measured from
occupational data. Columns (5) and (6) report the coe¢ cient estimates for the technical
complexity of export regressions where technical complexity is measured using skill intensity.
Standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. For each set of
results, we report regressions with and without country controls.
The statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on FC in columns (1) and (2) indicate that af-
￿liates in countries with high transport costs import a narrower range of intermediates
from their parents. The coe¢ cient estimate is not sensitive to controlling for a country￿ s
GDP per capita, the size of its population, or the corporate tax rate. We next turn our
attention to how the technological complexity of U.S. related party trade varies with the
35size of transport costs. Consider columns (3) and (4), which correspond to speci￿cations
in which complexity is measured using the occupational composition of commodities. In
both columns, the coe¢ cient on FC is positive and statistically signi￿cant indicating that
as the range of commodities imported by a¢ liates becomes narrower, the composition of
this trade is systematically shifting toward more technologically complex commodities. This
conclusion is reinforced by the results reported in columns (5) and (6), where complexity
is measured using the ratio of non-production to production workers. As transport costs
increase, the average skill intensity of U.S. related party trade is increasing. These results
strikingly support the mechanism present in our model: because technology transfer costs
make technologically complex intermediates hard to o⁄shore, intra-￿rm trade in these inter-
mediates is less sensitive to increases in transport costs than intra-￿rm trade in less complex
intermediates.21
Overall, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence in favor of the model. When an-
alyzing central hypotheses of our theory of costly technology transfer within multinationals,
we obtain precisely estimated parameter estimates in line with the model using data both
on individual multinational ￿rms as well as disaggregated information on the trade between
multinational parents and their a¢ liates.
We conclude with the following section.
21Additional results corresponding to speci￿cations in which the dependent variable is in logarithms are
reported in the appendix, Table A2; they con￿rm the results of Table 3.
364 Conclusions
Economists increasingly recognize that multinational ￿rms are the cornerstone of interna-
tional trade and technology di⁄usion. These ￿rms intermediate much of trade ￿ ows between
developed countries and are widely believed to be important conduits for knowledge ￿ ows be-
tween nations. It should be of great concern to economists, therefore, that the geographical
reach of most multinationals is actually quite modest, particularly given that the traditional
treatment of the multinational ￿rm is built on the premise that ￿rms can perfectly repli-
cate their technologies abroad and so geography should play little role in the structure of
multinational activities.
In this paper, we introduce a model of multinationals that demonstrates that explains
a rich array of multinational behavior by the interaction between physical transport costs
and technology transfer costs. As in much of the recent international literature, our model
considers physical transport costs and the ability of ￿rms to fragment their production tech-
nology into tradeable components. One key assumption is added: there also exist technology
transfer costs that are increasing in the complexity of components in the production process.
We show that the role of technology transfer costs manifests itself in the interaction be-
tween transport costs across countries and the technological complexity of ￿rms￿production
technologies: as transport costs increase, ￿rms have an incentive to replicate increasingly
complex (and therefore hard to transfer) activities abroad. This gives rise to increasing
marginal costs of serving foreign markets as the size of transport costs increase. This is
our explanation of why multinational ￿rms tend to be much more successful in their home
37market compared to foreign markets.
This simple mechanism gives rise to a set of important hypotheses that we can test. First,
the cost of intermediates imported from the parent in total a¢ liate costs should be decreas-
ing in transport costs between multinational parent and a¢ liate, and the rate of decrease
should be slower for ￿rms with relatively complex production technologies. Importantly, we
show that variation in this ratio is a su¢ cient statistic for variation in the marginal cost of
production facing foreign a¢ liates abroad. Second, because the rate of increase in marginal
costs is increasing in the complexity of a ￿rm￿ s production technology, the size of a¢ liate
sales such be decreasing in the size of transport costs but at a faster rate for ￿rms using rel-
atively complex production technologies. Third, the probability that a given multinational
opens an a¢ liate in a given foreign location should be decreasing in transport costs and the
rate of decrease should be faster for ￿rms using technically complex production technologies.
The fourth hypothesis is over the commodity composition of a¢ liate exports: as transport
costs increase, a¢ liates should concentrate their purchases of intermediates from their parent
in intermediates that are technologically more complex.
To evaluate these hypotheses empirically, we show that the model￿ s central predictions
can be tested using rather simple estimating equations. Moreover, we employ information
on the activity of individual U.S. multinational ￿rms from the BEA, highly disaggregated
Census data on U.S. intra-￿rm trade, as well as Department of Labor data on the problem
solving skills required for di⁄erent occupations, among other data, to give the theory a
certain empirical content. The resulting data base is richer than what is typically employed
in empirical analyses of the structure of trade and multinational production, and arguably
38it is the best data that exists to address questions in this area.
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence in favor of the model. For all four
hypotheses we obtain precisely estimated parameter estimates that con￿rm the predictions
of the model. We ￿nd that when technologies are relatively complex, a¢ liates have less
opportunity to substitute for imports from their parent with local production. Moreover,
both the extensive and intensive margins of a¢ liate activity contract as transport costs rise,
and this is most strongly the case for ￿rms with relatively complex production technologies.
The range of imported inputs of a¢ liates also becomes more concentrated in technologically
complex intermediates as transport costs increase.
There are a number of directions that we intend to work on in the future. First, the
empirical analysis in this paper has been based primarily on outward FDI, here the activity
of U.S.-owned a¢ liates in foreign countries. At the same time, the interplay of transport
costs, technology transfer costs, and factor price di⁄erences can lead to important di⁄erences
in the activities of multinational parents compared to a¢ liates, as we show with Proposition
1 above. These e⁄ects can be investigated by comparing the activities of U.S. multinational
parents and foreign-owned a¢ liates that are located in the United States. Second, we will
study the economic importance of technology transfer costs in an aggregative model that
builds on the framework developed here.
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43Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
BEA FDI Sample 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev. 
MC  -2.71  1.93 
LR  10.4  1.30 
FC  0.058  0.018 
RD  0.051  0.058 
RD*FC  0.0023  0.0028 
GDPPC  9.69  0.51 
POP  10.4  1.08 
TAX  3.45  0.207 
 
Census Trade Sample 
  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Scope  0.56  0.15 
Complexity  49.2  0.47 
Skill Intensity  0.54  0.035 
FC  0.065  0.018 
GDPPC  9.42  0.76 
POP  16.1  1.42 
TAX  3.41  0.24 
All variables except RD, Scope, Complexity, and Skill Intensity are in natural logarithms.  
Table 2: Transport Costs and the Structure of Affiliate Operations of U.S. 
Multinational Firms 
   
Hypothesis 1: 








Extensive margin of 
affiliate operations 
 
  Dependent variable: 




Local Affiliate  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
























GDPPC    -0.798 
(0.065) 
  0.903 
(0.034) 
  0.062 
(0.002) 
POP    -0.197 
(0.028) 
  0.495 
(0.015) 
  0.027 
(0.001) 
TAX    -0.301 
(0.124) 
  -0.172 
(0.064) 
  0.035 
(0.030) 
N  4,001  4,001  5,394  5,394  112,860  112,860 
R-squared  0.024  0.065  0.128  0.344  0.054  0.075 
All variables in all specifications are demeaned by firm.  The variables FC, GDP, POP, and TAX are in 
logarithms and RD is in levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the corresponding 
coefficient estimates. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the 
value of affiliate imports from their parent firms to cost of goods sold.  In columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of total affiliate sales to local customers. In columns (5) and (6), the 
dependent variable that is equal to one if the firm owns an affiliate and equal to zero otherwise.  
Table 3: The Scope and Technological Complexity of U.S. Intra-firm Exports 
   
Hypothesis 4: 
Scope and complexity 
of multinational parent exports 
 
  Scope  Average Technological Complexity 








  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












GDPPC    0.03 
(0.03) 
  -0.01 
(0.11) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
POP    0.05 
(0.01) 
  -0.13 
(0.05) 
  -0.01 
(0.003) 
TAX    -0.07 
(0.06) 
  0.48 
(0.18) 
















Notes: All standard errors (shown in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Scope is 
defined as the share of NAICS 6-digit product categories exported in the total number of possible 
categories. Average Complexity is the occupation based measure of the average technical 
complexity of exports. Average Skill Intensity is the average ratio of nonproduction workers to 
production workers of the product categories exported; details can be found in the text. 
 
 Appendix: Additional Equilibrium Conditions and
Results
Here we provide additional results concerning parent ￿rms, close the model, and provide
a fundamental comparative static result. We begin by deriving the marginal cost of the
parent ￿rm, the sales revenue and pro￿t directly generated by the parent ￿rm.
Consider ￿rst the marginal cost of the parent. Substituting for cP(’;z) using (6), the























summarizes the e⁄ects of technology transfer costs and physical shipping costs on parent
marginal cost. Because the parent ￿rm does not directly face technology transfer costs or
shipping costs it follows that CA
i (’) > CP
i (’). Di⁄erentiating equations (26) and (14), we
obtain the elasticities of the marginal costs of the parent ￿rm and its foreign a¢ liate in




























An increase in ￿S is associated with an increase in the marginal cost of both parent anda¢ liate. There are two additional implication of (28). First, we have "CA
￿S;i > "CP
￿S;i because
a¢ liates rely more heavily on imported intermediates than their parents. Second, the elas-
ticity of marginal cost with respect to ￿S is higher in relatively low-tech industries (high ￿)
because lower-tech industries rely more heavily on intermediates imported from the South.
We summarize this result in the following lemma:
Lemma 2: The elasticity of marginal cost of the parent ￿rm with respect to ￿S given
by "CP
￿S is strictly less than the elasticity of the marginal cost of north a¢ liate with respect to
￿S, given by "CA
￿S .
Following the arguments in the text, it is straightforward to show that the revenue
generated by the parent ￿rm of type ’ in industry i is given by
R
P




Because the parent ￿rm￿ s marginal cost is less than that of its a¢ liate, the parent ￿rm








￿ wNf ￿ 0; (29)
should be greater. Substituting (26) into this expression and rearranging yields the cuto⁄










P(￿S;￿S;￿i)): (30)It should be clear from the fact that the marginal cost of the parent is less than the marginal
cost of the a¢ liate that b ’
P
i < b ’
A
i , which is a feature of most heterogeneous ￿rm models.












i (’)dG(’) ￿ wN￿i = 0; (31)
where ￿P
i (’) is given by (29) and ￿A
i (’) is given by (19). Having closed the model, we can
generate the following result concerning the e⁄ect on changes in international shipping costs:
Proposition 6 A decrease in either ￿S or ￿N results in a decrease in b ’
A and an increase
in b ’
P
Because the proposition does not consider variation across industries, we suppress the
industry subscript. First, consider the e⁄ect of a reduction in the size of ￿S, the cost of
















Note that we have suppressed the arguments in gP for more compact notation.28), this































To calculate the size of dAi=Ai, we use the free entry condition. Substituting for the




























Note that we have suppressed the arguments in gP for more compact notation. Also notice
the fact that the two countries are identical and has been used in writing this expression.
Entering ￿rms drive down the industry price index, causing the mark-up adjusted demand
level to shift until expected variable costs equal expected ￿xed costs.




= (￿ ￿ 1)
"CP
￿S exp((1 ￿ ￿)gP)V (b ’
P) + "CA







> 0:This expression shows that the change in the mark-up adjusted demand level is proportional
to a weighted average of the elasticities of marginal costs with respect to the southern
transport costs for the parents and the a¢ liates and so dA=d￿S > 0. Substituting this












exp((1 ￿ ￿)gA)V (b ’
A)
exp((1 ￿ ￿)gP)V (b ’








￿S , it follows that db ’
P=d￿S < 0. An increase in Southern trade costs














exp((1 ￿ ￿)gP)V (b ’
P)
exp((1 ￿ ￿)gP)V (b ’






By Lemma 2, we have "CA
￿S > "CP
￿S , it follows that db ’
A=d￿S > 0. An increase in the Southern
trade cost increases the cuto⁄ productivity for foreign a¢ liates.



























: (36)Finally, totally di⁄erentiating the free entry condition, we obtain
dA
A
= (￿ ￿ 1)
"CA
￿N exp((1 ￿ ￿)gA)V (b ’
A)
exp((1 ￿ ￿)gP)V (b ’





Combining this expression with (35) and (36), it follows immediately that db ’
P=d￿N < 0 and
db ’
A=d￿N > 0.Appendix 
 
Table A1: Alternative specifications of the Effect of Trade Costs on the 
Structure of Affiliate Operations of U.S. Multinational Firms 
   
Hypothesis 1: 
Import vs. local production 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Intensive margin of 
affiliate operations 
 
  Dependent variable: 
Import Cost Share 
Dependent variable: 
Local Sales 







  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












































  0.703 
(0.077) 






  0.406 
(0.035) 










Industry  Industry  Industry  Firm  Industry  Industry 
N  4,001  4,001  2,401  2,401  5,394  5,394 
R-squared  0.020  0.165  0.156  0.086  0.380  0.473 
Coefficients on industry indicator variables are suppressed. The variables FC, GDP, POP, and TAX are in 
logarithms and RD is in levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the corresponding 
coefficient estimates. The Import Cost Share columns (1) and (2) correspond to specifications in which 
the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the value of total affiliate imports from their parent 
firms to cost of goods sold.  The Import Cost Share columns (3) and (4) correspond to specifications in 
which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the value of affiliate imports of goods 
intended for further manufacture to cost of goods sold.  The Local Sales columns (5) and (6) correspond 
to specifications in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of total affiliate sales to local customers.  
Table A2: The Scope and Composition of U.S. Intra-firm Exports – Log 
Specifications 
   
Hypothesis 4: 
Scope and complexity 
of multinational parent exports 
 






Average Skill-intensity-  
based Complexity 
































The dependent variables in these three specification are in logarithms. All standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Scope is defined as the share of NAIC 6-digit product 
categories exported in the total number of possible categories. Average Complexity is the occupation 
based measure of the average technical complexity of exports. Average Skill Intensity is the average ratio 
of nonproduction workers to production workers of the product categories exported 
 
 